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1 Introduction
The wave of capital ows running through many emerging market economies since the
early 2000s up to the beginning of the "great contraction", brought renewed attention on
how macroeconomic policies should respond to these ows, especially in light of current
account balance positions (see Figure 1) and the degree of reserves accumulation (see Figure
2). Prior to the current downturn, these capital ows were associated with ample global
liquidity and favorable worldwide economic conditions, in many cases they were (at least in
part) a reection of strengthened macroeconomic policy frameworks and growth-enhancing
structural reforms.1
Figure 1: Net Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and Current Account Balances
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However, capital inows also generate important challenges because of their potential
to generate overheating, loss of competitiveness, and increased vulnerability to crises. Ac-
cordingly, signicant concerns about the stability of national and international nancial
systems stemming from the crises that occurred throughout the 1990s have been voiced
throughout the last few years. Some economists view increasing nancial openness and
unregulated capital ows as a grave obstruction to global nancial stability (see Bhagwati,
1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000, 2003; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008), leading to calls
for capital controls (such as Tobin taxes) on international asset trade. Other econo-
mists have argued that increased openness to capital ows has, in general, proven vital
for countries aiming to leapfrog from lower- to middle-income status, while considerably
1Moreover, they help deliver the economic benets of increased nancial integration (see Garita, 2008).
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Figure 2: Gross Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the Accumulation of Reserves.
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enhancing stability among industrialized countries (e.g. Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000).2
Moreover, the fear has re-emerged that in an environment of relatively free international
capital markets currency crises are becoming more frequent and that such developments
may easily spill over to other economies.
Interestingly, there is little empirical evidence supporting the view that nancial open-
ness by itself increases vulnerability to crises. However, while crisis episodes receive most of
the attention, they are just (for the most part) spiky expressions of the more general phe-
nomenon of macroeconomic volatility. As the foregoing discussion points out, the intensity
and time-clusteringof the crises has now forced both policy makers and academics to fo-
cus on systemic crises as a principal culprit. For example, during the 1990s developed and
developing countries experienced severe nancial di¢ culties, including balance-of-payments
crises and systemic banking failures. Accordingly, the scale and impact of these events re-
newed interest in the existing systemic risk literature and stimulated a large volume
of new theoretical and empirical work to explain and/or predict crises in order to provide
countries with appropriate policy advice needed to avert any impending crises. In response
to these events, several di¤erent theoretical models were developed showing how crises end
up spreading across countries. For example, some of the major models of systemic crises
are based on trade linkages and macroeconomic similarities (Gerlach and Smets, 1995;
Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; van Rijckeghem and Weber, 2001), while
2This is evidently a matter of substantial policy signicance, especially with economies like China and
India having taken steps to open up their capital accounts; but also because of the current "nancial crisis"
engulng the world economy.
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other models are based on nancial linkages, neighborhood e¤ects, and exogenous shifts in
investorsbeliefs (Masson, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000;
Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
In rst-generationinterpretations of currency crises,3 the vitality (or lack thereof) of a
xed exchange rate is established by external fundamentals unconnected to how economic
agents behave. For instance, in the aforementioned models, economic agents base their
beliefs on the assumption that scal imbalances and/or domestic credit policies will not
a¤ected by their actions. By contrast, "second-generation" models of crises are based on the
interface between expectations and actual outcomes, in which market expectations solidly
inuence macroeconomic policy, leading to self-fullling crises.4 For example, in a country
whose monetary authorities are committed to maintaining a xed exchange rate but are
willing to oat their currency under extraordinary circumstancesthen foreign investors
would face the possibility of a devaluation of that currency. This in turn would reduce the
value of their claims if the countrys loans from abroad were denominated in the borrowing
nations domestic currency. Moreover, if foreign investors considered the possibility of a
devaluation to be very likely, they would charge a high-risk premium on their loans. This
implies that the economiesborrowing costs would rise signicantly, thereby reducing credit
opportunities and restraining output growth. Given this scenario, the authorities would
decide to devalue their currency in order to enhance aggregate demand, since they would
consider the costs of maintaining "the x" to be too high. Interestingly, the devaluation
would validate the initial investorsexpectations, which leads to self-fullling prophecies
in that the expectations of devaluation lead to actions (a risk premium hike) that raise the
opportunity cost of defending the xed exchange rate.
As discussed by Pesenti and Tille (2000), the main advantage of resorting to such an
interpretation of currency crises is the ability to di¤erentiate between two types of volatility:
"one related to nancial markets and one related to macroeconomic fundamentals". Given
this explanation, market sentiment plays an important role in the determination of a
crisis, especially when it comes in the form of unexpected changes in expectations. Since
we know that exchange rates (and other asset prices) are less predictable than they are
in models with a unique outcome, as a result, second generation models are deemed to
"square better with the stylized facts of global nancial markets" (Masson, 1999). When
speculators expect the occurrence of a crisis across countries, they have an incentive to
3The approach was pioneered by Krugman (1979), who adapted a model by Salant and Henderson
(1978) to the analysis of currency crises. It was further developed by Flood and Garber (1984).
4The standard studies on self-fullling crises are Obstfeld (1986, 1994).
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engage in nancial market transactions that create links between otherwise separate
markets; Kodres and Pritsker (2002) have called this process "cross-market rebalancing".
That is, if speculators expect that a crisis in country i will be immediately followed by a
crisis in country j, they have an incentive to be active in both (currency) markets in order
to "benet" from this joint correlation. When a crisis occurs in country i, it will change
the wealth levels of these speculators and, therefore, change their actions in country j0s
currency market in a way that increases the probability of a crisis in the latter. The belief
that joint crises will occur is self-fullling: if investors expect there to be no correlation
between the outcomes of the two markets, they will have no incentive to rebalance their
portfolios, and join crises will not occur. This view is a simple theory of systemic risk
in which a devaluation of one currency acts as a signal that coordinates expectations on
the crisis equilibrium in another currency market.5 The immediate source of joint crises
equilibrium in this simple setting, is the fact that the same investors can be active in
both markets, which generates a wealth channel through which crises are transmitted (see
Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
While joint crises can occur in other areas of an economy, the likelihood and harshness
in nancial systems is often regarded as considerably higher, since a full crisis in the nan-
cial system can have strong adverse consequences for general economic welfare. Moreover,
because no open economy can fully insulate itself from its "surrounding environment",
countries may need to adopt regionally and/or globally coordinated measures in order to
prevent "systemic risks". However, despite the plethora of currency crises models, consen-
sus does not exist with respect to the relevant channels and the implications for policy. For
example, if the trade channel is relevant then countries may need to diversify their trade
portfolio, and/or x their exchange rates (collectively) in order to avoid speculative attacks
following the loss of international competitiveness. If, on the other hand, the "nancial
integration" channel is relevant, then countries may need to impose capital controls on
(short-term) capital ows.
Accordingly, we study whether nancial openness and other channels help reduce the
probability of a currency crises. To address this issue, the paper follows a three-step ap-
proach and answers three interrelated questions: (i) How can we best capture the systemic
linkages of crises? (ii) Is the systemic risk of currency crisis a regional or a global phe-
nomenon? (iii) By controlling for the "systemic impact" of currency crises, does nancial
5If two countries are highly integrated, of course, (through trade, etc.) it is not entirely surprising
that a crisis in one would have strong e¤ects on the other. The importance of expectations is most often
stressed in cases where the two currencies are, at least in principle, not closely related.
5
opennessincrease the probability of a currency crisis? Methodologically, we rst employ
an alternative statistical method known as extreme value theory (EVT) to identify the
linkage between currency crises. This statistical technique is particularly well designed to
address the extreme co-movements of nancial market crises. In an univariate setting, this
approach has been used to study the frequency of currency market (Koedijk et al., 1990;
Hols and de Vries, 1991), stock market (Jansen and de Vries, 1991; Longin, 1996) and bond
market (Hartman et al., 2004) crashes in industrial countries. By focusing on emerging and
developing markets (Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere) we extend the analysis of
extreme exchange rate uctuations to a bivariate setting, measuring the joint occurrence
of currency market crashes through our newly created CPJF. Secondly, we propose a re-
vised version of the "crises elsewhere" or "neighborhood variable that is often constructed
in the contagion literature. By construction, the "crises elsewhere" variable found in the
literature only considers whether one of the neighboring countries is su¤ering a crisis; how-
ever, this methodology gives the same weight and importance to the crises in (all) other
economies, which is counterfactual in light of the fact that economies may have di¤erent
links during crises periods. Accordingly, our second step is to incorporate the di¤erent
levels of connections between countries by taking into account the conditional probability
of joint failure (CPJF) to weight our crises indicators, which results in a new measure of
systemic impact vis-à-vis currency crisis. In this manner we downweight those economies
which are less connected, while giving a higher weight to those economies that are more
highly interconnected. Thirdly, we estimate a panel probit model as in Eichengreen et al.
(1996), to test the e¤ects of other potential causes of currency crises, such as nancial
openness, by controlling for the "systemic impact" of currency crises.
Therefore, the research herein di¤ers from the literature in at least two ways. First,
the evaluation of systemic risk is undertaken by using extreme value theory (i.e. by taking
into account extreme co-movements), which represents a signicant deviation from prior
work in this area. This new approach opens the opportunity to construct a new "crises
elsewhere" variable, which quantitatively measures the systemic impact of currency crises.
Secondly, we use an expanded data set representing many di¤erent regions of the world.
This allows us to test the impact of nancial openness (and the inow of di¤erent types of
capital) on a broader basis, while also allowing the systemic impact of currency crises to
operate through the neighborhood or "cross-market rebalancing" channel.
Overall, our results indicate that currency crises are linked, but mainly within regions,
contrary to what is often voiced by pundits. The probit results reveal that higher levels
of de facto nancial integration into world nancial markets lowers the probability of a
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crises when controlling for the "systemic impact" of currency crises. Moreover, our results
also indicate that the sudden stop of long-term capital ows (i.e. FDI) and their reversal
exacerbates the probability of a crisis. We also show that monetary policy geared towards
price stability reduces the probability of a currency crisis. Therefore, the answers to the
aforementioned questions are: (i) the CPJF measures the systemic linkages of crises and
helps in improving our understanding of systemic risk. Furthermore, by constructing the
weighted systemic impact variables based on CPJF helps to provide a more informative
measure for a specic country; (ii) yes, the systemic impact of currency crises does exist,
but only regionally; and (iii) by accounting for the systemic impact of currency crises
correctly (i.e. by reducing information asymmetry), nancial openness helps reduce the
probability of a currency crisis.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodol-
ogy and data sources. Section 3 discusses the tail dependence and/or independence of
the economies in our sample vis-à-vis currency crises. Section 4 provides analysis of the
empirical ndings, while section 5 performs an out-of-sample investigation. Section 6 is
entirely devoted to the discussion of our robustness checks. Last but not least, section 7
concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
In this section, we introducing our data and the procedure of constructing an exchange
market pressure (EMP) index. We then use EVT to specify the crisis variables for each
country. Thirdly, we present our general methodology for analyzing the e¤ect of di¤erent
sources on currency crises. In the end, we introduce our newly created "systemic impact"
variable, which incorporates information on crises linkages.
2.1 Exchange Market Pressure Index
Following Girton and Roper (1977) and Eichengreen et al. (1996), we construct an ex-
change market pressure index as a weighted average of (nominal) exchange rate changes,
international reserve changes, and interest rate changes, to measure speculative pressure
on a country and its currency. A common feature of studies that try to comprehend the
fundamental determinants of currency crises is the construction of a single composite index;
that is, an index of exchange market pressure that will systematically identify the presence
and harshness of currency crises or speculative attacks on a currency. In this light, studies
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such as Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996), Sachs et al. (1996), and Kaminsky et al. (1998),
have proposed di¤erent approaches to the construction of the EMP index. The EMP is a
good index of currency crisis as it reects di¤erent manifestations of speculative attacks,
be they successful or not. The argument is that the central bank of a country may allow
the currency to depreciate in response to intense speculative attack against its currency. In
some other cases, the bank may defend the currency by running down its foreign exchange
reserves or by raising interest rates. Therefore, our exchange market pressure for country
i at time t is computed as follows:
EMPit =
1
e
eit
eit
  1
r

rmit
rmit
  rmus;t
rmus;t

+
1
it
( (iit   ius;t)) (1)
where eit are the units of country i0s currency per U.S. dollar in period t; e is the standard
deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate (eit
eit
); rmit is the ratio of gross foreign
reserves to money stock or monetary base for country i in period t; r is the standard
deviation of the di¤erence between the relative changes in the ratio of foreign reserves and
money (money base) in country i and the USA

rmit
rmit
  rmus;t
rmus;t

; iit is the nominal interest
rate for country i in period t; ius;t is the nominal interest rate for the USA in period t;
it is the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate di¤erential ( (iit   ius;t)).6 We
construct the data set ranging from 1978  2007.
By denition, a currency crisis occurs when the realized exchange market pressure is
unusually large. The main problem with this terminology is in dening the threshold
that determines the largeness of the index, and therefore, the approach used varies from
study to study. In the literature, this is usually done by assuming a normal distribution of
the EMP. More specically, the customary manner of choice for the statistical threshold
previously mentioned has involved arbitrary multiples of the standard deviation of the
EMP above its mean (i.e. 1.5, 2, or 3 standard deviations are commonly used). There
are at least two criticism on such a procedure. First of all, it relies on the EMP index
being normally distributed. Secondly, by considering the EMP as a normally distributed
variable, the threshold is arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, the conventional method of dening
currency crises is statistically awed and/or inaccurate in capturing the truedispersion
of any given EMP series. In other words, the conventional method of employing the mean
6In theory, for a pure oat, the change in the exchange rate would correspond exactly to the index of
exchange market pressures. At the other extreme, for a peg, the exchange rate would be constant, and
uctuations in the EMP would be driven entirely by changes in reserves and/or interest rates through
intervention.
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and standard deviation may underestimate the frequency of speculative attacks.
In fact, the threshold chosen in the literature simply corresponds to a quantile at a
"certain" probability level.7 In order to dene a crisis, we also use a quantile of the EMP
series as our threshold choice; however, we do so without a priori specifying the distribution
of the EMP. Moreover, for determining the level of probability for the threshold, we consider
extreme value theory as the proper instrument. Similar to de Haan and de Ronde (1998),
we estimate the tail index of the EMP distribution by using a Hill plot (see Hill, 1975),
from which we choose the suitable threshold.
Figure 3: Hill Plots for Selected Asian Economies
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We rst calculate the Hill estimators against the number of high order statistics k, and
then choose a level k around which the estimate, as shown in Figure 3, is stable. For all
countries in our sample, k  45; this level corresponds to a quantile with probability level
45=337 = 13:3%.8 Formally, this means that for a certain country i, let us denote the EMP
series as EMPit at time t. Then we take its V aR at probability level 13.3% denoted by
V aRi as the suitable threshold for dening a tail event in country i.9 We then construct
7In nance, the high quantile is the so-called Value-at-Risk (VaR). That is, for a risk factor X, its VaR
at a given level p is dened as V aR(p), which satises P (X > V aR(p)) = p. Therefore, by assuming
a normally distributed EMP, the mean plus 1.5 standard deviation threshold corresponds to a VaR at
probability level 6:7%.
8Given our time period, we have 348 months at our disposal. However, due to missing data for some
months, at the end we can only work with 337 months.
9As previously mentioned, these are the 45th order statistics from the top.
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a dichotomous tail event variable for country i at time t as
Crisisit = 1 if EMPit  V aRi (2)
= 0 otherwise:
Here we use the notation "crisis", while the indicator is in fact measuring a tail event.
As we will discuss later, within the extreme value theory setup, the linkages between crises
of two economies can be extrapolated from the linkages between tail events. Thus, in the
empirical sections, we will use the indicators of tail events for evaluating the linkages and
extrapolate these tail events to the linkage between crises.
2.2 Econometric Approach
Once the decision has been made on how to choose the threshold in order to dene the
crisis variable, it is eventually employed either as a binary dependent index variable in
logit/probit models, or instead as a continuous dependent variable in a more "structural"
empirical model of currency crises. In this subsection we lay out the specics of the
model that we employ to test whether the probability of a crisis in an individual country
is a¤ected by events occurring elsewhere. According to a number of theoretical models
mentioned in the introduction, currency crises may occur simultaneously among countries
that have a trade channel, that have a similar macroeconomic fundamentals, that are more
nancially integrated into the world capital markets, and that are neighbors. Therefore,
following Eichengreen et al. (1996) we estimate a panel probit model using monthly data
for 23 emerging and developing economies (see Appendix A, B, and C for the list of sample
countries, data descriptions, and descriptive statistics respectively) as follows:
Crisisit = Dit(Crisis) + I(L)it + "it (3)
where
Dit(Crisis) = 1 if Crisisjt = 1 for any j 6= i and j & i 2 (same region)
= 0 otherwise
In this model, D(Crisis) is the "traditional" crises elsewhere variable, which considers
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other countries in the same region with the same importance; the vector I(L)it is an
information set of macroeconomic control variables (see appendix B for a full description).
This information set includes the growth rate of money (M2) as a percentage of interna-
tional reserves, CPI ination, domestic credit as a percentage of GDP, the growth rate of
real GDP, the percentage of government budget (net) balance relative to GDP, and the
percentage of the current account relative to GDP.10 We also include variables that capture
the di¤erent channels by which crisis may take place (or can be exacerbated). For instance,
we include several de facto measures, such as trade openness, nancial integration,11 FDI
inows, portfolio inows and debt inows, in order to provide a better picture of the extent
of a countrys integration into global (nancial) markets. Last but not least, we also aug-
ment our model by including a dummy variable capturing the onset of a banking crisis12
in order to capture the link between banking and currency crises13.
The choice of the control variables are justied in the literature; that is, these fun-
damental controls are included in line with the arguments of the rst generation models
of speculative attacks, which was rst brought to light by Krugman (1979) and was later
modied by Flood and Garber (1984). A number of papers have extended the Krugman-
Flood-Garber model in other directions (see for example Agénor et al., 1992). Edwards
(2005) looks at this issue using a more sophisticatedmeasure of de jure nancial openness
that attempts to capture the intensity of capital controls. He looks at two manifestations
of external crises; sudden stops of capital inows, and current account reversals. He nds
no systematic evidence that countries with higher capital mobility tend to have a higher
incidence of crises, or tend to face a higher probability of having a crisis, than countries
with lower mobility. In subsequent work, Edwards (2006) concludes that there is no evi-
dence that the output costs of currency crises are smaller in countries that restrict capital
mobility. In sum, there is little formal empirical evidence to support the often-cited claims
that nancial globalization (in and of itself) is responsible for the epidemic of nancial
crises that the world has seen in recent history.
10Each variable enters as deviation from the corresponding variable of the center country, which in our
case it is the United States.
11Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports over GDP; we use nancial integration following
the nomenclature used by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and Kose et al. (2006), which is the sum of
nancial assets and liabilities divided by GDP.
12Dates for the onset of banking crisis were taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
13 This link has been thoroughly documented by, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Glick
and Hutchinson (2001).
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2.3 Weighting Tail Events
As has been previously mentioned, the "crises elsewhere" variable constructed in the lit-
erature only considers whether at least one of the other countries in the same region is
su¤ering a crisis. Hence, this procedure gives the same weight (i.e. the same importance)
to crises in (all) other economies. Intuitively, however, countries may have di¤erent links
during crises, or non-normal, periods. Therefore, in order to incorporate the di¤erent levels
of connections between economies, we need, as a rst measure, the dependence of the tail
events of the EMPs between the di¤erent economies.
The traditional method employed to study interdependencies between di¤erent random
events is the (pearson) correlation coe¢ cient, since correlations characterize general inter-
dependencies. However, there are two drawbacks to this measure for the purposes of this
paper14. First, the correlation coe¢ cient measures dependence during normal times (i.e.
given "moderate levels"), and it is largely dominated by the moderate observations rather
than the extreme observations. Second, the denition of the correlation coe¢ cient depends
on the assumption of nite variance; however, the distribution of asset returns (e.g. ex-
change rates) may not be normally distributed, that is, the tails of the return distributions
can be "fat". For instance, by looking at the Hill plots (Figure 3), we cannot rule out
the possibility that the tail index may be below 2, which means that the variance of the
EMP index can be innite; therefore, what we require is a measure of tail dependence.15
We dene the "conditional probability of joint failure" (CPJF) as follows16: given that at
least one of two economies is in a crisis, the CPJF is dened as the conditional probability
that the other country is also in a crisis. That is, suppose that EMPi and EMPj are the
EMPs of countries i and j, then the corresponding V aR (value at risk) at probability level
p of these two variables are V aRi(p) and V aRj(p). We then dene:
CPJF i;j= lim
p!0
P (EMP i> V aRi(p) and EMP j> V aRj(p)jEMP i> V aRi(p) or EMP j> V aRj(p))
(4)
which can be rewritten as
14A classic reference is Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who show that by adjusting for heteroskedastic
biases, "there was virtually no increase in unconditional correlation coe¢ cients".
15We have at our disposal a few indicators that capture tail-dependence stemming from multivariate
extreme value analysis (see Embrechts et al., 2000; Hartman et al., 2004).
16This measure is reminiscent of the correlation coe¢ cient, in the sense that the asymptotic independence
case corresponds to 0, while full dependence corresponds to 1.
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CPJFij = E[j  1]  1 (5)
where
E[j  1] = lim
p!0
P (EMPi > V aRi(p)) + P (EMPj > V aRj(p))
1  P (EMPi  V aRi(p); EMPj  V aRj(p)) (6)
is the dependence measure introduced by (Embrechts et al., 2000), and rst applied by
(Hartman et al., 2004). Notice that under the multivariate extreme value analysis frame-
work, the limit in (4) and (6) exists (see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7); hence, even
for a nite level of p, as soon as p is at a "low level", the conditional probability is already
close to its asymptotic value.17 In other words, the CPJF will be stable when comparing
the linkage between crises and tail events. Therefore, in order to estimate CPJFi;j, we use
the following estimator (see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7):
\CPJF i;j =
P
tCrisisitCrisisjtP
tCrisisit +
P
tCrisisjt  
P
tCrisisitCrisisjt
(7)
A higher CPJF between two countries indicates that nancial crises in these two coun-
tries are more likely to occur at the same time. Moreover, the CPJFs between one economy
(e.g. A) and other economies (e.g. B, C, D) in the same region may vary, which high-
lights (as previously mentioned) the di¤erent linkages during crisis periods. Therefore,
when constructing a systemic impact variable that accounts for the impact of crises in a
region, it is necessary to use the CPJFs between economies as weights. In this manner
we downweight those economies which are less connected, while giving a higher weight to
those economies that are more interconnected; this accords with the "cross-market rebal-
ancing" e¤ect as derived by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Therefore, our newly constructed
"systemic impact" variable is given as:
Wit(Crisis) =
X
j 6=i
CPJFijCrisisjt: (8)
Therefore, by employing our new systemic impact variable, we will re-test our probit model
as follows:
17Therefore, the choice of p for dening a crisis is insensitive when it is at a "low level".
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Crisisit = Wit(Crisis) + I(L)it + "it: (9)
3 Tail Dependence or Independence?
As shown in section 2.3, we measure systemic risk in a bivariate setting through the
conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF). The CPJF always lies between 0 and 1.
If it is zero, then the probability of a joint tail event is negligible; however, if it is one,
then a tail event in one economy will always go hand in hand with the "downfall" of the
other economy. Therefore, our rst step is to test H0 : CPJF = 0 from the asymptotic
distribution of the CPJF estimator (for details of this test, see de Haan and Ferreira,
2006). The results are shown in Appendix D (Tables 13, 15, and 17), and are discussed in
the following subsections.
3.1 Asia
Table 12 shows the regular dependence among Asian countries, and although a few negative
numbers appear they are quite close to zero; moreover, the correlation coe¢ cient between
Asian economies indicates moderate dependence at best. For example, Pakistan, in general,
can be considered as independent from the other countries, while Thailand can only also
be considered independent from all other countries, except with Malaysia. Some other
bilateral relationships worth highlighting are: Singapore-Malaysia ( = 0:51), Australia-
Japan ( = 0:40) and Korea-Japan ( = 0:37). Compared to Table 12, Table 13 shows quite
some di¤erent results for tail-dependence. For example, the aforementioned relationship
between Australia and Japan now exhibits a much lower (non-signicant) dependence
level (CPJF = 0:15), indicating that these countries tend to be independent during crisis
periods. As far as Singapore-Malaysia, and Korea-Japan , we can once again see a strong
(highly signicant) link during crisis periods (CPJF = 0:27, CPJF = 0:22, respectively).
Moreover, Thailand-India are actually more dependent during crisis periods (CPJF =
0:27) than a standard correlation analysis would indicate. The above comparison shows
that regular-dependence and tail-dependence are independent. Therefore, if we solely relied
on the standard correlation coe¢ cient, we would tend to misjudge the dependency during
crisis periods in Asian economies.
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3.2 Western Hemisphere
The regular dependence measure among western hemisphere economies, shown in Table 14,
indicates low dependence. The only exceptions are Argentina-Brazil ( = 0:40), followed
by Argentina-Mexico ( = 0:18). Table 15 exhibits the tail dependence in the Western
Hemisphere region. Compared to the Asia results, tail dependence is weaker in "the west",
as none of the CPJFs are signicantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, we can only conclude
that economies in this region are independent from one another during currency crises.
3.3 Africa
Table 16 shows a very high regular dependence among African economies, while Table 17
continues to display extremely high CPJFs. For example, Burkina Faso, Côte dIvoire,
Mauritius and Mali are highly dependent. Niger and Senegal show the highest tail de-
pendence in this region (CPJF = 0:91). It is also worth pointing out that South Africa
is in general independent from the other African economies in our sample during crises
periods. Given the above observations, we can categorize the African economies into three
groups: group 1: Burkina Faso, Côte dIvoire, Mauritius and Mali; group 2: Niger and
Senegal; group 3: South Africa. This classication shows that dependence during a crisis is
(in general) observed within groups; however, these groups can be considered independent
from each other.
3.4 Global (in)dependence
One of the claims that is most often voiced in the literature and in the media is that
systemic currency crises can travel across regions, where, for example, one of the most
often heard claims is that the crises of the 1990s spread from Mexico to Asia during the
Mexican crisis in 1994, and from Asia to Latin America during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis.
moreover, that market turbulence was transmitted to Latin America following the 1998
Russian default. Tables 18-20 show the tail dependence across the three regions (Africa,
Asia, and the Western Hemisphere), where we observe low levels of tail-dependence across
regions. Therefore, we can only conclude that currency crisis are not very likely to spread
from region to region.
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4 Probit Estimation Results
4.1 Asia Sample
We begin this section by discussing the traditional "crises elsewhere" variable approach
often used in the literature (see Table 1), then we will compare and contrast these results to
our new approach based on the "systemic impact" variable (see Table 2). Since probit co-
e¢ cients are not easily interpretable we also include the e¤ects of a one standard deviation
percentage change in the regressors on the probability of a crisis (mfx). The unweighted
results for Asia are consistent with the existence of a regional e¤ect (as captured by the
"traditional" neighborhood dummy often used as a starting point in the literature).
Table 1, tells us that a speculative attack elsewhere in Asia is associated with an
increased probability of a domestic currency crisis of around 9 percentage points. We
also control for the onset of a banking crisis, where it is apparent from these results that
the onset of a banking crisis is signicantly correlated with a currency crisis in Asia, and
only when we control for various types of capital ows (see specication 1:5), does this link
disappear. The results in Table 1 also support some of the predictions of the rst generation
models of speculative attacks, where a currency crisis stems from inconsistencies between
macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate commitment. According to the results
reported in Table 1, the probability of a currency crisis increases with an increase in CPI
ination, and the government budget decit as a percentage of GDP (both signicant at the
1%), all measured relative to the USA. This latter result shows that countercyclical scal
policy18 in the form of slower growth in government expenditure is strongly associated with
lower exchange market pressure. Table 1 also shows that as GDP growth increases, the
odds of a speculative attack increase by 1%, which hints at the fact that Asian economies,
which have enjoyed tremendous and steady growth in GDP should be careful of the upside
risk (e.g. overheating) associated with such "prosperity".
When we look at nancial integration (column 1:2) and at trade openness (column
1:3), we do not nd any particular e¤ect vis-à-vis currency crises (specications 1:2 and
1:3 respectively). Another way to look at de facto nancial openness, is to discriminate
between capital ows (i.e. between FDI, portfolio and debt), as we do in column 1:5 of
Table 1. These results show that higher (and sustained) levels of FDI and portfolio-type
18Countercyclical in the sense of scal restraint during boom.
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inows are associated with a lower probability of a crisis (FDI inows lower the probability
of a currency crisis by 3:1%, while portfolio inows lower it by 1:6% given a one standard
deviation shock); on the other hand, debt inows increase the probability of a currency
crisis by 0:3% for a one standard deviation shock.
After employing the "traditional crises elsewhere" variable, we replace it by our newly
constructed "systemic impact" variable. As discussed in Section 2:3, our CPJF weight
captures the di¤erent links between crises of the underlying economy and its neighbors.
Therefore, we argue that it also captures the expectations that investors form regarding
the value of their assets, given that there is a crisis elsewhere in their (investment) region.
In this view, the combination of our CPJF with the tail event indicators, which yields our
"systemic impact" variable, summarizes the macroeconomic risk factor structure of asset
values. According to the "cross-market rebalancing" argument, when speculators expect
the occurrence of a crisis across countries, they have an incentive to engage in nancial
market transactions that create links between otherwise separate markets. Table 2
shows the results of substituting the traditional "neighborhood" dummy variable with
our systemic impact variable. While most results remain similar to those presented in
Table 1, we focus on comparing and contrasting the di¤erences between the two tables.
As a rst step, it is important to point out that by using our systemic impact variable,
we improve the t of the equations; moreover, our systemic impact variable enters quite
strongly and highly signicantly. The positive sign of the coe¢ cient on this new variable
indicates that the probability that the domestic economy will experience a currency crisis
increases by around 6% for a one standard deviation increase in systemic risk19. We
argue that, in line with the cross-market rebalancing e¤ect, when market participants are
hit by an idiosyncratic shock in one Asian economy, they transmit the shock abroad by
"optimally" rebalancing their portfolios exposure to macroeconomic risks through other
countriesmarkets. We also control for the onset of a banking crisis, where it is important
to note that once we control for systemic risk, then the onset of a banking crisis is now
no longer signicantly correlated with a currency crisis in Asia. We argue that this arises
from the reduction of information asymmetry as provided by our new variable; thereby
breaking the link between "the twin crises". When it comes to GDP growth, Table 2 now
19In our case, join crises only occurs within the same region, since as shown in section 3.4, currency crisis
is not very likely to jump across regions. Furthermore, keep in mind that this new variable is continuous
and we have applied a one standard deviation shock. If we evaluate this variable at the mean, then the
marginal e¤ect is about 24%.
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shows that this variable does not enter signicantly. Specication 2:2 indicates that, once
we control for systemic impact, more nancial integration (as proxied by the sum of nan-
cial assets and liabilities over GDP) is benecial for Asian economies as far as reducing
the probability of a currency crisis. This result di¤ers from the arguments put forth by "-
nancial globalization critics" who have argued that a high-degreeof nancial integration
may be detrimental since it can be conducive to volatility in capital movements; thereby,
leading to large reversals in capital ows, in turn leading to nancial crises20 (see Bhag-
wati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008; Stiglitz, 2000, 2003). Moreover,
the link between capital controls and crises could also reect the fact that some of the
countries are more integrated in terms of de facto measures of integration and therefore
that capital controls do not insulate them from crises.
However, as emphasized by Chang and Velasco (2000) and as previously mentioned, the
likelihood of large reversals in short-term capital ows increases the possibility of "liquidity
runs", which can be quite costly to borrowers. In general, movements in domestic economic
fundamentals, as well as external factors such as world interest rates, inuence the volatility
of capital ows (Agenor, 1999).21 Moreover, the fact that investor sentiment is constantly
changing in response to new information creates the potential for markets to overshoot,
thereby generating nancial crises. Accordingly, the IMF (2007) has argued that episodes
of very large capital inows are associated with an acceleration of GDP growth, which
suggests that for episodes of large capital inows ending abruptly, it may take some time
to recover fully from the economic slowdown associated with a hard landing.
As far as the di¤erent types of capital ows, Table 2 corroborates the results found
in Table 1 for short-term (debt) and medium-term (portfolio) ows. However, long-term
capital ows (i.e. FDI) now do not have any e¤ect. This latter result for FDI is not
surprising given that this type of investment is more stable and persistent (see Sarno
and Taylor, 1999), and therefore "less risky". At the very least, these results suggest that
longer-term capital inows (in-and-of-themselves) do not seem to have insidious side e¤ects
20However, such an analysis may su¤er from selection bias. Often it is countries with poor macroeco-
nomic fundamentals that put controls in place in order to try to insulate themselves from crises. Glick
et al. (2006) address this issue, and they nd that capital account openness reduces the probability of
currency crises, even after controlling for selection bias in terms of how macroeconomic policies inuence
the existence of capital controls.
21Domestic market distortions can also amplify the volatility of capital ows. For example, to the
extent that private capital ows are channeled to the domestic economy through commercial banks, then
ine¢ ciencies in credit markets can amplify the e¤ect of changes in world interest rates, and thereby lead to
oscillations in domestic output that may have feedback e¤ects on capital ows (see Agénor and Aizenman,
1999).
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for Asian economies22. Therefore, policymakers should keep a close eye on short-term
capital ows since they are more prone to sudden stops and quick reversals and therefore,
can be particularly destabilizing for Asian economies. Table 2 also shows that the current
account variable (specication 2:4) enters with the expected sign even after controlling for
"systemic impact"; where an increase in the current account decit (i.e. lower reserves)
increases the probability of a currency crisis by 2:1%. It is worth mentioning that previous
studies have been unsuccessful in linking current account decits to currency crisis (see for
example Eichengreen et al., 1996).
4.2 Western Hemisphere Results
The unweighted results23 for the Western Hemisphere (see Table 21 in appendix E) show
that a speculative attack elsewhere in the region is associated with an increased probability
of a domestic currency crisis of around 5 percentage points, as measured by the "regular"
neighborhood dummy variable. When we substitute the regular "neighborhood" variable
with our new "systemic impact" variable, the results remain relatively similar to Table
21; that is, when the systemic impact variable is shocked by a standard deviation, the
probability that the domestic economy will experience a currency crisis increases by around
3:7%. At rst glance, this result seems to contradict our "tail-independence" conclusion
of section 3:2; however, the results in section 3:2 are pairwise, while the regression results
presented in this section takes into account the systemic impact within the entire Western
Hemisphere region.
As far as the onset of a banking crisis, we nd that when a western hemisphere econ-
omy has experienced a banking crisis, then the probability that this economy experiences
a currency crisis increases by 13% on average,24 even after controlling for "systemic im-
pact".Moreover, according to the results reported in Table 3, the probability of a currency
crisis increases by 4:8% on average with a standard deviation increase in CPI ination,
while the probability of a currency crisis increases by 2:5% for the same shock to the M2-
to-international-reserves ratio (i.e. liquidity). Since this latter ratio captures the extent
22Garita (2009) shows that FDI inows are benecial for GDP growth through improvements in TFP
growth.
23When we exclude Canada from the sample and consider only the Latin American countries, the results
do not change. These are available upon request.
24This conrms the result found by Glick and Hutchinson (2001) that banking crises tend to preceed
currency crises.
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to which the liabilities of the banking system are backed by international reserves; then
in the event of a currency crisis, individuals will start rushing to convert their domestic
currency deposits into foreign currency. Therefore, this latter result shows that a higher
ability of a central bank to withstand this demand pressure (i.e. a lower ratio) reduces the
probability of a crisis. Furthermore, this e¤ect can be associated with greater exchange
market pressure because higher returns on domestic assets end up attracting more capital
inows and fueling upward pressures on the currency.
A major di¤erence between Asian and western hemisphere economies, is that the latter
economies have had a more di¢ cult time in creating (sustained) GDP growth, and accord-
ingly, our results show that western hemisphere economies need to grow in a more steady
and sustained fashion in order to decrease the probability of a currency crisis. That is, a
one standard deviation increase in GDP growth will decrease the probability of a crisis by
2% on average for these economies. As far as nancial integration (see Table 3, column
3:2), we nd that the marginal e¤ect on the probability of a currency crisis is negative,
implying a decrease of almost 2% (once again, this result runs counter to what the nan-
cial globalization critics have long argued). Additionally, specication 3:3 shows that the
current account balance exerts a negative e¤ect on the probability of a currency crisis for
these economies.
The literature on the benets of FDI has argued that "total" foreign direct invest-
ment may bring new technology and management techniques that increase the e¢ ciency
of acquired rms and generate economy-wide spillovers (see for example Garita, 2008).
For example, Mishkin (2006) has argued that developing countries can import greater ef-
ciency by allowing foreign investors to take controlling stakes in domestic nancial rms,
and thereby bring in state-of-the-art nancial intermediation practices.25 When we dis-
criminate between capital ows, the results found in column 3:5 show that higher (and
sustained) levels of FDI inows are associated with a decrease in the probability of a cur-
rency crisis of 7% (given a one standard deviation shock); while portfolio and debt inows
have no e¤ect.
4.3 Africa Results
As far as African economies, the unweighted results in Tables 22 (see Appendix E) show
that a speculative attack elsewhere in the African region is associated with an increased
25In a recent study, Garita (2008) shows that FDI helps improve TFP for both developed and developing
economies
23
probability of a domestic currency crisis of around 20 percentage points, as measured by
the regular "neighborhood" variable. Turning to our systemic impact variable (see Table
4), we see that it improves the t of the equations for African economies, but that it
also shows a strong e¤ect vis-à-vis currency crises. As was shown in Section 4:3, African
economies are highly tail dependent, and therefore the occurrence of joint crises is very
likely in this region. This indicates that when market participants in this region experience
an idiosyncratic shock in one economy, they transmit the shock abroad by "optimally"
rebalancing their portfolios exposure to macroeconomic risks through other countries
markets. As far as the link between the onset of a banking crisis and currency crisis,
for these sample of African countries we do not nd any association between these two
variables even after controlling for systemic impact. The intuition for this result follows
the a similar reasoning as given for the Asian economies in section 4:1.
Table 4 also shows that the probability of a currency crisis increases with an increase in
CPI ination and a higher M2-to-international reserves ratio (i.e. for African economies,
increases in "domestic credit" increase the probability of a currency crisis). This latter
result corroborates the argument of "rst generation" models that the defense of the ex-
change rate in a country with expansionary monetary policy and a xed-exchange rate
will cause domestic credit to expand, which will tend to surpass the growth in demand
for the domestic currency. Therefore, economic agents who are accruing excess liquidity
have a preference to swap domestic currency for foreign-denominated securities or domes-
tic interest-bearing assets; both settings lead to a drop in value of the domestic currency.
In the former case, increased demand for foreign securities leads to pressure"; while in
the latter, market participants will sell domestic securities due to increases in domestic
bond prices, and will buy higher yielding foreign assets due to falling domestic yields.
The domestic central bank must conform to the increased demand for foreign currency by
reducing its foreign reserves since it is committed to keeping the exchange rate xed. In
sum, the loss of reserves for African economies stems from the process of domestic credit
expansion.
We point out that when taking the systemic impact variable into account, nancial
integration becomes insignicant (see specications 4:2); however, the insignicancy of the
onset of a banking crises variable remains. Combining these these two results shows that
the strong systemic impact underlying African economies is the main source of currency
crises. In other words, it is not necessarily the integration into nancial markets that can
24
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cause a problem; rather it is information asymmetry that can create and exacerbate the
problem. However, trade openness does enter signicantly and with the expected sign,
implying that a standard deviation increase in trade openness will reduce the probability
of a currency crisis by 3:6% on average. As far as the di¤erent types of capital ows, only
FDI inows are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a speculative attack by
about 3% (see column 4:5), while portfolio inows increase the probability of a currency
crisis by 1:4% for a standard deviation shock.
5 Out-of-Sample Analysis
As we have previously explained, our systemic impact variable was constructed based on
the conditional probability of joint failures (CPJF), which stems from the same dataset
used in the probit regressions. However, it is worth pointing out that the CPJF matrix
identies the tail linkages across countries in the same region, which does not change
dramatically between periods. Therefore, in order to check for any potential endogeneity,
we now construct our systemic impact variable at a certain point in time t, by using the
data in [t  240; t  1] to re-estimate the CPJFs (hence the CPJF estimation is now based
on a moving window period all of the same length).
As was discussed in section 2, when constructing the CPJF it is necessary to specify
the number of high order statistics k (recall from Section 2 that we choose k = 45 when
using the entire sample of 337 months). In this out-of-sample case, by using an identical
procedure as in section 2, we nd that k = 40.26 We then compare the real data at
time t with the thresholds, and identify which countries experience a tail event (i.e. this
leads to the variables Crisisit). The next step is to use equation (6) to calculated our
systemic impact variable, which is now entirely constructed from past information, thereby
eliminating any potential endogeneity in our probit model. We distinguish between the
approach in this out-of-sample section and the entire sample approach of section 4, by
referring to them as the out-of-sampleand the in-sampleapproach respectively. Before
proceeding with the results, we must mention that the onset of a banking crisis variable
could not be included in this out-of-sample analysis due to collinearity with the constant,
since during this new sampling period there are no onsets of banking crisis, thereby,
rendering the model unidentied.
26It is quite remarkable that the corresponding probability level is 40=240 = 16:7%, which is quite close
to the one used for the entire sample 13:3%. The Hill plots for these new results are available upon request.
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For the sake of conciseness, Table 5 only presents the results for our de facto measures
of nancial integration (all other results are available upon request). First of all, our
systemic impact variable is still highly signicant for Asia and Africa, but not for the
Latin American economies, corroborating the pattern found in section 4. When it comes
to nancial integration (assets plus liabilities over GDP), we conrm our previous ndings
that Asian economies benet from integrating into world capital markets, whereas Latin
American economies are not hurt nor do they benet from nancial integration. Previously,
we had found that nancial integration did not have any e¤ect on currency crises for
African economies; however, Table 5 (specication 5:5) now indicates that this variable
has a positive and signicant e¤ect even after controlling systemic impact, indicating that
these "developing" economies are clearly not ready to integrate into world capital markets.
When it comes to the di¤erent types of capital ows, the patter found in section 4 remains
the same.
We also analyze the possible predictive power of our model by lagging our exogenous
variables. We follow the methodology described above by including the "out-of-sample"
systemic impact variable, and by only focussing on de facto nancial integration into
world capital markets. The results found in Table 6, indicate that, for all regions, we can
conrm that our (lagged) systemic impact variable does have predictive power vis-à-vis
future currency crises. Lagged nancial integration does not have any predictive power
in relation to the probability of a currency crisis in Asia and the Western Hemisphere;
however, as was found in Table 5, for African economies a one standard deviation increase
in nancial integration in the previous period (t   1) will increase the probability of a
currency crisis (in period t) by over 2%. The consequences of di¤erent types of capital
inows are varied, depending on the region. For example, for Asian economies a large
inow of portfolio-type capital in the previous period (t  1), will reduce the probability of
a currency crisis in period t. The result that medium-term capital ows can be benecial
for Asian economies, since these economies will benet from the further development of
bond markets, as recently argued by, for example, the IMF. For the Western Hemisphere
economies, the results reported in column 6:4 in Table 6 indicate that FDI inows help
reduce the probability of a currency crisis. We also nd that a large inow of portfolio-type
capital will increase the probability of a currency crisis one period in the future for Western
Hemisphere economies.
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Even though not reported in Table 6, for Asian economies, the trade openness variable
is negatively signicant (at the 10%) with a marginal e¤ect of 1%, which indicates that
these economies benet from more trade openness in the previous period, since it helps
reduce the probability of a currency crisis "today". For Western Hemisphere economies,
we also nd that the trade openness variable is highly signicant but this time at the 1%,
with a marginal e¤ect of 13:5%.27
6 Robustness
Our analysis in Section 4 was regional, where the choice of pooling data is reasonable
since systemic risk is, as far as we nd, regional. Nonetheless, as a robustness check we
reproduce the same analysis as in section 4 but this time at the country level. In general,
the results do not change for each region. For example, the signicance of the di¤erent
types of capital inows still holds at the country level, but only for South Korea, Malaysia,
and Singapore, while our systemic impact variable remains highly signicant at the country
level (see Figure 4, based on South Korea, for a graphical example of the aforementioned
results). However, for Western Hemisphere economies we nd that our systemic impact
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of a Currency Crisis, Capital inows, and Systemic Impact
to South Korea.
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27Excluding Canada does not change the results. These and other results are available upon request.
30
variable is only signicant for Argentina and Mexico. This result mirrors the conclusions
reached through Table 15, namely that linkages between crises in the Western Hemisphere
economies is in general weak. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the results found in Section
4:2, where we found that that the systemic impact variable is signicant. The di¤erence
might due to the data pooling e¤ects.
We also conduct a second robustness check by changing the threshold level. As we
explained in Section 2:3, when we construct the CPJF, we choose, according to the Hill
plots, the top 13:3% order statistics, which we use to construct our systemic impact vari-
able. Theoretically speaking, multivariate extreme value theory (MEVT ) ensures that the
estimation of the CPJF is insensitive to the choice of threshold. However, this property
does not necessarily ensure a stable result for the probit model; it is thus necessary to
check the robustness by changing the threshold.
For our new threshold we choose a level of 6:7%, which is the threshold used by Eichen-
green et al. (1996) under normality assumptions ( + 1:5). Obviously, such a threshold
choice is more restrictive vis-à-vis the denition of a tail event (i.e. it leads to an under-
estimation of risk). It is worth pointing out that by shifting the threshold level, the
dependent variable as well as our systemic impact variable also change; however, changing
the threshold does not change any of the other control variables. The results from this
last exercise point to three major di¤erences: Firstly, our systemic impact variable is no
longer signicant for Western Hemisphere economies. This result, alongside the evidence
stemming from the individual country results, conrms the fact that pooling data for the
Western Hemisphere bears potential estimation problems, especially since (as we have pre-
viously argued) the economies in this region of the world are tail independent in terms
of currency crises. Hence, we cannot consider the signicance of the systemic impact in
section 4:2 as robust. Our second major di¤erence relates to nancial integration, which is
now not signicant for any of the regions in our sample. This insignicancy indicates that
when we consider a more restrictive level of tail events, we can only benet from nan-
cial integration policies by reducing information asymmetry (i.e. by taking into account
systemic impact). The third major di¤erence relates to the e¤ects of the various types
of capital ows. More specically, if we solely relied on the 6:7% threshold results, we
would conclude that African economies could benet from all types of capital ows, since
they all enter signicantly and negatively, which of course points to a di¤erent direction as
compared to the results in section 4. Accordingly, we can only conclude that our systemic
impact variable is insensitive to the choice of threshold. Therefore, in order to gain a better
understanding on the consequences of open capital markets in relation to the reduction of
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currency crises, it is imperative to specify the risk level precisely as we have done in this
paper.
7 Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the understanding of systemic impact vis-à-vis currency
crises, by further exploring the e¤ect of other channels such as nancial openness. Through-
out the paper we have argued that cross-market rebalancing is an important source of joint
crises; however, until now, the systemic impact of crises in other countries has proved dif-
cult to measure empirically. For example, the standard approach to capturing systemic
impact only considers whether at least one of the other economies in the same region is
su¤ering a crisis. Intuitively, however, countries may have di¤erent links during crises peri-
ods; therefore, in order to incorporate the di¤erent levels of connections between countries,
we need as a rst measure, the dependence of the EMPs between di¤erent countries dur-
ing periods of extreme values. Accordingly, we constructed the conditional probability of
joint failure (CPJF), which is a new and more informative measure of "tail-dependence".
The CPJF has three major advantages: (1) it identies tail events using a relatively more
objective method based on extreme value theory; (2) it proxies for expectations, since it
allows us to construct our proxy for systemic impact; and (3) the estimation of the CPJF
is insensitive to the denition of a tail event.
By employing monthly data for 23 emerging and developing economies spanning dif-
ferent regions of the world for the period 1978-2007, a battery of statistical and empirical
tests reject, at high levels of condence, tail-independence at the regional level. However,
at the global level (i.e. joint crises across regions), we can only conclude tail independence.
Furthermore, the degree of within region dependency can be ranked in the sense that
Africa economies show the most dependence, followed by Asia. Interestingly, we nd that
the Western Hemisphere economies are the most independent when it comes to the trans-
mission of currency crisis. We then used probit models to compare our newly-constructed
systemic impact variable with the standard approach in the literature of treating all neigh-
boring economies equally. Firstly, our systemic impact variable helps to improve the t
of the model. Secondly, our variable displays higher economic signicance in evaluating
the possibility of a currency crisis, particularly in regions demonstrating strong or at least
some tail-dependence such as in Asia and Africa. In a more tail-independent region such
as the Western Hemisphere, the e¤ect is still present and signicant; however, the e¤ect is
weaker. Therefore, our probit estimation results conrm that the probability of a currency
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crisis in a given economy increases signicantly due to the systemic impact of crises in a
region, especially in regions that are more "tail-dependent".
One of the main objectives of the paper was also to nd out whether integration into
world (capital) markets increases nancial instability, as has been argued by many. By
taking systemic impact into account, we observe that de facto nancial integration and
trade openness both help to reduce the occurrence of currency crises, but the former e¤ect is
only applicable for more developed emerging markets. When it comes to the di¤erent types
of capital ows, we nd that all regions benet from "persistent" FDI inows, and that
Asia is the only region that benets from a steady increase in portfolio-type inows. We
also found that higher exchange market pressure is associated with a stronger acceleration
of CPI ination, and expansionary scal policy. Western Hemisphere economies, behave
di¤erently from Asian economies in relation to the impact of GDP growth, since Western
Hemisphere economies can reduce the probability of a currency crisis by increasing their
GDP growth in a more stable fashion. Furthermore, lack of international reserves and
higher levels of CPI ination can have quite damaging e¤ects as far as excessive pressure
in their respective currencies. For African economies we nd that an improvement in
ination, the government budget balance, and international reserves, can certainly benet
these economies. We also controlled for the onset of banking crises, and our results have
shown that for more tail-dependent regions such as Asia and Africa, currency crises are
mainly driven by speculative attacks rather than by the onset of local banking crises. On
the other hand, for a more independent region such as the Western Hemisphere, the onset
of a banking crisis is a signicant source of currency crises. All in all, our systemic impact
variable, by accounting for information asymmetry and the "level of speculative attacks"
in a given region, provides us with a proper instrument for evaluating currency crises.
At the onset of the paper we asked three interrelated questions: (i) How can we best
capture the systemic linkages of crises? (ii) Is the systemic risk of currency crisis a regional
or a global phenomenon? (iii) By controlling for systemic impact, do other mechanisms
like nancial openness increase the probability of a currency crisis? The answers to those
questions are now clear: (i) the CPJF measures the systemic linkages between currency
crises and helps to improve our understanding of this e¤ect. Furthermore, our systemic
impact variables, which is based on the CPJF, provides a more informative measure for
the systemic impact to a specic country; (ii) Yes, systemic risk does exist, but only
from (regional) neighbors; (iii) By taking into account systemic impact (i.e. by reducing
information asymmetry), de facto nancial integration into world capital markets helps
reduce the probability of a currency crisis.
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Given these answers, several important policy implications emerge from the empirical
results presented in this article. First, once a crisis begins in a given region, the interna-
tional community should be prepared to support other economies in the region that have
good economic fundamentals. Secondly, there is a need for governments to undertake
transparent monetary and scal policies, in order to reduce information asymmetry espe-
cially vis-à-vis the private sector, and help the latter form expectations that are closer
to those of the monetary and scal authorities. Third, the results indicate that countries
must pursue monetary policy aiming at "price stability" in order to mitigate a currency
crisis. Lastly, though countries can prevent the onset of a currency crisis by pursuing
polices that result in sound internal and external macroeconomic balances, currency crisis
can still spread to such countries; therefore, the prevention, resolution, and management of
the systemic impact of the crises may require more thoroughly coordinated actions among
the di¤erent regional economies.
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Appendix A - Country Sample
Table 7: Regions and Countries in Sample
Region Country Region Country
Africa Burkina Faso Asia Australia
Cote dIvoire India
Mali Indonesia
Mauritius Japan
Niger Korea
Senegal Malaysia
South Africa New Zealand
Western Hemisphere Argentina Pakistan
Brazil Philippines
Canada Singapore
Mexico Thailand
Venezuela
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Appendix B - Data Sources and Variables
 Period-average exchange rate: Local Currency Unit per US dollar (IFS line rf)
 Short-term interest rate given by money market rate (IFS line 60r) if available, or the
discount rate (IFS line 60) otherwise. However, for India we use the call money rate
(IFS line60b) and supplemented with the inter-bank lending rate (IFS line60p). For
New Zealand, we supplemented with the T-bill rate (IFS line60c). For Indonesia, we
use the call money rate (IFS line60b) and supplemented with the 3-month deposit
rate (IFS line60l). For Morocco, we supplemented with the discount rate (IFS line60).
 Total non-gold International Reserves in US dollars (IFS line 1L.D)
 Domestic credit in national currency (IFS line 32)
 M1 in national currency (IFS line 34)
 M2 in national currency (IFS, M1 plus line 35)
 GDP in national currency (IFS line 99b)
 CPI (IFS line 64)
 Current Account Balance (net) in national currency (IFS, line 78ALD) is the sum
of the balance on goods, services, and income, plus current transfers, credit
 Overall Budget Balance in US dollars (IFS line 78CBD) is the sum of the balances
on the current account, the capital account, the nancial account, and net errors and
omissions.
 Financial Assets (IFS line11) in national currency
 Financial Liabilities (IFS line16c) in national currency
 Merchandise Exports (IFS line70) & Merchandise Imports (IFS line71); both in US
dollars
 FDI Inows (IFS line78BED) this category includes equity capital, reinvested earn-
ings, other capital and nancial derivatives associated with various inter-company
transactions between a¢ liated enterprises.
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 Portfolio Inows (IFS line 78BGD) includes transactions with non-residents in -
nancial securities of any maturity such as corporate securities, bonds, notes, and
money market instruments, other than those included in direct investment, excep-
tional nancing, and reserve assets.
 Debt Inows (IFS line 78BID) include all transactions not included in direct invest-
ment, portfolio investment, nancial derivatives, or other assets. Major categories
are trade credits, loans, transactions in currency and deposits, and other assets.
Table 8: Construction of Variables (in millions of USA dollars)
Variables Construction
Annual growth rate of domestic credit = Di¤erence in logs from IFS line32
Government Budget as % of GDP = (IFS line 78cbd) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Current Account as % of GDP = (IFS line 78ald/IFS line rf) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Ratio M2 to international reserves = ((IFS line 34+35)/IFS line rf) /
(IFS line .1ld)
CPI Ination = Di¤erence in logs from IFS line64
Financial Openness = [(assets + liab.)/IFS line rf] /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
Trade Openness = (exports + imports) /
(IFS line 99b/IFS line rf)
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Appendix C - Descriptive Statistics
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Asian Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in Domestic Credit Growth 3810 0.005 0.04 -0.73 0.71
Di¤ in Liquidity 3810 -71.68 37.07 -213.93 54.17
Di¤ in GDP growth 3660 0.004 0.04 -0.12 0.91
Di¤ in Current Account 3626 0.27 0.47 -0.76 2.81
Di¤ Government Budget 3658 0.001 0.01 -0.07 0.05
Di¤ CPI Ination 3122 0.14 0.88 -4.50 12.82
Di¤ in Financial Integration 3609 2.05 2.51 -0.02 12.18
Di¤ in Trade Openness 3651 0.09 0.48 -0.23 2.29
FDI Inowsz 3305 0.23 0.72 -15.34 10.43
Portfolio Inowsz 3305 0.74 3.23 -25.60 40.98
Debt Inowsz 3305 0.18 3.50 -46.44 21.01
Neighborhood Dummy 3685 0.52 0.50 0 1.00
Systemic Impact 3685 0.21 0.27 0 1.95
Onset banking Crisis 3817 0.04 0.21 0 1
Moving Window Systemic Impact 1045 0.10 0.15 0 0.85
note: z = in billions of US dollars
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for West. Hemisphere Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in Domestic Credit Growth 1599 0.03 0.07 -0.23 0.82
Di¤ in Liquidity 1659 -69.18 31.31 -211.06 38.01
Di¤ in GDP growth 1473 0.02 0.20 -0.11 3.30
Di¤ in Current Account 1470 -0.38 3.27 -35.93 0.14
Di¤ Government Budget 1470 -0.008 0.44 -5.22 1.25
Di¤ in Financial Integration 1463 15.01 28.01 -1.05 429.48
Trade Openness 1469 4.58 2.98 0.06 38.52
Di¤ CPI Ination 1671 3.79 9.80 -2.19 196.39
FDI Inowsz 1503 0.70 1.11 -2.23 10.69
Portfolio Inowsz 1503 0.52 1.30 -2.99 13.28
Debt Inowsz 1503 0.10 1.37 -11.04 8.95
Neighborhood Dummy 1680 0.39 0.49 0 1
Systemic Impact 1680 0.06 0.09 0 0.48
Onset banking Crisis 1680 0.05 0.22 0 1
Moving Window Systemic Impact 480 0.03 0.06 0 0.34
note: z = in billions of US dollars
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for African Economies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Di¤ in Domestic Credit Growth 2399 0.0008 0.05 -0.38 0.36
Di¤ in Liquidity 2264 -37.58 131.60 -211.83 1727.79
Di¤ in GDP growth 2345 0.002 0.02 -0.18 0.33
Di¤ in Current Account 2177 0.27 0.24 -0.84 0.76
Di¤ Government Budget 2177 -0.02 0.30 -2.81 2.30
Di¤ in Financial Integration 2352 1.50 0.74 0.13 3.78
Di¤ CPI Ination 2294 0.14 1.75 -17.04 15.18
FDI Inowsz 2177 0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.61
Portfolio Inowsz 2033 0.04 0.20 -0.25 1.82
Debt Inowsz 2177 0.01 0.08 -0.16 0.75
Neighborhood Dummy 2359 0.39 0.49 0 1
Systemic Impact 2359 0.20 0.37 0 1.94
Onset Banking Crisis 2408 0.03 0.18 0 1
Moving Window Systemic Impact 679 0.15 0.31 0 1.81
note: z = in billions of US dollars
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Appendix D - Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Table 12: Correlation within Asia; 1978M1-2006M12
Aus India Indo Jap Kor Malay New Z. Pak Philip Sing Thai
Australia 1 0.13 0.15 0.40 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.30 0.12
India 0.13 1 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.19
Indon 0.15 0.11 1 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.18
Japan 0.40 0.18 0.22 1 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.08 0.39 0.09
Korea 0.19 0.16 0.29 0.37 1 0.38 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.40 0.11
Malaysia 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.38 1 0.20 0.13 0.29 0.51 0.33
New Z. 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.13 0.20 1 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.15
Pakistan 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.05 1 0.05 0.15 -0.01
Philip -0.02 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.29 0.12 0.05 1 0.15 0.06
Singap 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.51 0.14 0.15 0.15 1 0.11
Thailand 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.11 1
Table 13: CPJF in Asia; 1978M1-2006M12
Aus India Indo Jap Kor Malay New Z. Pak Philip Sing Thai
Australia 1 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.13
India 0.10 1 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.27
Indonesia 0.18 0.10 1 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.08
Japan 0.15 0.15 0.22 1 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.18
Korea 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.22 1 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.14
Malaysia 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.25 0.18 1 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.30 0.27
New Z. 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.17 1 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.11
Pakistan 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.14 1 0.15 0.10 0.11
Philip 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.15 1 0.15 0.10
Singap 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.30 0.18 0.10 0.15 1 0.20
Thailand 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.20 1
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
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Table 14: Correlation in West. Hemisphere; 1978M1-2006M12
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.40 0.10 0.18 0.11
Brazil 0.40 1 0.11 0.08 0.05
Canada 0.10 0.11 1 0.08 0.05
Mexico 0.18 0.08 0.08 1 0.06
Venezuela 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 1
Table 15: CPJF in West. Hemisphere; 1978M1-2006M12
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.07
Brazil 0.15 1 0.08 0.18 0.14
Canada 0.10 0.08 1 0.11 0.08
Mexico 0.17 0.18 0.11 1 0.06
Venezuela 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.06 1
Table 16: Correlation in Africa; 1979M2-2007M9
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Burkina Faso 1 0.73 0.92 0.35 0.08 0.09 0.01
Côte dIvoire 0.73 1 0.78 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.01
Mali 0.92 0.78 1 0.37 0.04 0.04 0.02
Mauritius 0.35 0.30 0.37 1 0.06 0.05 0.07
Niger 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 1 0.99 0.25
Senegal 0.09 0.61 0.04 0.05 0.99 1 0.25
South Africa 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.25 1
Table 17: CPJF in Africa; 1979M2-2007M9
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Burkina Faso 1 0.50 0.76 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.08
Côte dIvoire 0.50 1 0.58 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.11
Mali 0.76 0.58 1 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.08
Mauritius 0.25 0.23 0.25 1 0.11 0.11 0.10
Niger 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 1 0.91 0.20
Senegal 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.91 1 0.18
South Africa 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.18 1
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
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Table 18: CPJF between Asia and Africa
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Australia 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.13
India 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.11
Indonesia 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Japan 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10
Korea 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10
Malaysia 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10
New. Z. 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13
Pakistan 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.03
Philippines 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07
Singapore 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08
Thailand 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
Table 19: CPJF between Asia and West. Hemisphere
Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico Venezuela
Australia 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.08
India 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.07
Indonesia 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.10
Japan 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.10
Korea 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.08
Malaysia 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.08
New. Z. 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.05
Pakistan 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Philippines 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.03
Singapore 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.13
Thailand 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.10
Bold indicates tail dependence is signicant at better than 10%
Table 20: CPJF between West. Hemisphere and Africa
Burkina F. Côte dIvoire Mali Maurit Niger Senegal S. Africa
Argentina 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.20
Brazil 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
Canada 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
Mexico 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.17
Venezuela 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.05
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Appendix E - Unweighted Results for WH and Africa
Table 21: Western Hemisphere Sample Panel Probit Results; 1978M1 - 2006M12
21:1 mfx 21:2 mfx 21:3 mfx 22:4 mfx 22:5 mfx
Di¤ in Liquidity 0.004 2.5 0.004 2.2 0.004 2.5 0.004 2.5 0.005 2.8
(2.35)  (1.78)  (2.16)  (2.28)  (3.97) 
Di¤ in GDP growth -0.45 -1.7 -0.69 -2.5 -0.48 -1.8 -0.45 -1.7 -0.56 -1.9
(-1.68)  (-3.62)  (-2.06)  (-1.65)  (-2.33) 
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.02 4.9 0.05 8.8 0.02 3.9 0.02 3.9 0.02 2.9
(3.65)  (8.67)  (3.90)  (3.35)  (3.94) 
Di¤ Fin. Open. -0.003 -1.7
(-2.40) 
Di¤ Trade Open. -0.02
(-0.89)
Di¤ Current Acc. 0.002 -0.9
(2.93) 
FDI inows -0.37 -7.1
(-3.01) 
Portfolio inows -0.08 -2.0
(1.66) 
Debt inows -0.06
(-1.37)
Onset Bank. Crisisz 0.56 14.1 0.53 12.9 0.55 13.8 0.57 14.3 0.43
(2.50)  (2.26)  (2.39)  (2.53)  (1.55)
Regular Neighbor 0.42 8.5 0.37 7.2 0.43 8.7 0.41 8.3 0.37 6.9
Dummyz (5.19)  (4.79)  (5.83)  (5.26)  (5.04) 
Observations 1473 1461 1467 1468 1296
McFadden R2 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.33
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
sig. levels respectively; Robust z-statistic in parenthesis; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves);
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; z = mfx is based on a discrete change from 0 to 1
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Table 22: Africa Sample Panel Probit Results; 1979M2 - 2007M9
22:1 mfx 22:2 mfx 22:3 mfx 22:4 mfx 22:5 mfx
Di¤ in Dom. Credit 2.31 1.7 2.39 1.9 3.21 2.28 1.7 2.30
(1.67)  (1.65)  (0.52) (1.71)  (1.48)
Di¤ in Liquidity 0.001 2.6 0.001 2.6 0.001 3.9 0.001 2.6 0.001 2.6
(5.82)  (5.24)  (7.71)  (5.30)  (5.29) 
Di¤ in GDP growth 1.26 1.37 -1.46 1.15 1.42
(1.05) (1.21) (-0.84) (0.95) (0.95)
Di¤ in Gov. Budget -0.37 -0.35 -0.31
(-1.59) (-1.60) (-1.31)
Di¤ CPI Ination 0.04 1.2 0.04 1.2 0.14 6.1 0.04 1.1 0.05 1.4
(2.04)  (2.07)  (3.36)  (1.96)  (2.17) 
Di¤ Fin. Open -0.13 -1.6
(-3.17) 
Di¤ Trade Open. 0.009
(1.47)
Di¤ Current Acc. -0.70 -2.8
(-4.62) 
FDI inows -4.26 -4.8
(-4.30) 
Portfolio inows -0.21
(-0.32)
Debt inows 0.99
(0.47)
Onset Bank. Crisisz 0.06 0.06 1.71 60.3 0.06 -0.01
(0.23) (0.22) (25.12)  (0.23) (-0.05)
Regular Neighbor 1.25 25.1 1.25 24.9 0.76 19.4 1.21 23.9 1.23 25.0
Dummyz (5.21)  (5.24)  (4.17)  (4.96)  (5.37) 
Observations 1908 1908 449 1908 1773
McFadden R2 0.32 0.33 0.80 0.33 0.20
Notes: Dependent variable is a crisis dummy; model includes a constant; *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1%
sig. levels respectively; Robust z-statistic in parenthesis; Di¤ in liquidity = di¤ in (M2/Int. Reserves);
mfx = (marginal e¤ect*standard deviation)*100; z = mfx is based on a discrete change from 0 to 1
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